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OBJECTIVE DECISION MAKING IN
LONERGAN AND DWORKIN
Abstract: Critical Legal Scholars argue that judges are unable to make
truly objective decisions. This view gained strength in 2000 in Bush v.
Gore, when the U.S. Supreme Court decided the presidential election
largely along partisan lines. This Note, however, argues that Critical
Legal Scholars fail to provide positive, constructive answers to the
problems of objective decision making. Alternatively, the Note examines
these problems through the philosophies of Bernard Lonergan and
Ronald Dworkin. The Note explains both philosophers' approaches to
objective decision making, then examines those approaches in the
context of Bush v. Gore. The Note concludes that Lonergan's philosophy,
though not designed specifically for legal thinking, provides the
stronger means for understanding and achieving objective judicial
decision making.
INTRODUCTION
It seems like every time a judge decides an important well-
publicized case, those with access to the media who disagree immedi-
ately criticize the decision. A common approach for these critics is to
show how the judge's decision-making process was not objective; that
is, that the decision was influenced by the judge's personal character-
istics, such as political persuasion, race, ideology, gender, or economic
background. 1 This critique is often accomplished by demonstrating
that the current decision is at odds with one of the judge's previous
decisions or publicly stated principles, other times by simply stating
that the decision produces sonic sort of favorable effect for whatever
class of persons the judge is assumed to be favoring. 2 Despite the po-
tential asymmetry in this type of critique of judge's decisions, 3 their
I See Vincent Bugliosi, None Dam Call ft Treason, NATION, Feb. 5, 2001, at 12; Ronald
Dworkin, A Badly Flawed Election, N.Y. REV. Boom, Jan, 11, 2001, at 53; Mary McGrory, Su-
inrme Travesty of-Justice, WASH. Pos•, Dec. 14, 2000, at A3.
2 SCCBugliosi, supra note 1; Dworkin, supra note 1; McGrory, supra note 1.
5 If the decision by the judge is inconsistent with a previous decision, and improperly
influenced by the judge's biases, what about the previous decision with which it is being
contrasted? Was that decision motivated by the opposite bias? And what effect should the
simple fact that a favored group receives or is denied a benefit have upon the judge?
Should she make the opposite decision on the basis of what group is affected, or would
that merely be an example of the same bias in reverse?
825
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effect is to strike at the heart of the United States' system of govern-
ment: the independent, and formally neutral, judiciary.}
This issue was thrown into stark relief in the United States' most.
recent presidential election. The election was extremely close, and
the entire country watched with fascination as the two main candi-
dates, George W. Bush and Albert Gore, Jr. contested every aspect. of
the race, before and after Election Tuesday, in the media, the Florida
vote counting offices and the courts. 5 When the United States Su-
preme Court finally decided between the two candidates, 6 half the
country was delighted and half disgusted.? But Americans were also
nervous: What exactly did it mean that the Supreme Court, one of the
most respected institutions in the country, had apparently voted down
party lines?8
 At the time, pundits proclaimed loudly that such a bla-
tant abuse of the Court's power had dealt a deathblow to the Court's
prestige.9
This election presents an almost perfect scenario in which to
consider whether objective decision making is possible, and if so, how
an individual should go about making such decisions. The judges
who, in essence, voted for George W. Bush, were criticized for allow-
ing their political persuasion to sway their decision.° In this case, one
specific aspect of the judges' personalities, their political persuasion,
was blamed for the decision, and this characteristic happens to be one
of the easiest for critics to highlight because of the United States' two
party system."
4 See U.S. CONST. art. M.
6 See ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE 19-52 (2001) (discussing in detail the
elements of the political and judicial struggle that occurred between Democrats and Re-
publicans while contesting the Florida vote).
6 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98,98 (2000). For further discussion of this case, see infra
notes 285-357, and accompanying text.
7
 Drawing from the fact that the national popular vote was very nearly a tie. See Charles
Fried, 'A Badly Flawed Election: An Exchange, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 22,2001, at 8.
8
 The five Justices of the majority were appointed by Republican presidents. See DER-
sitowtiz, supra note 5, at 198-99.
9 Id. at 3-4 (listing various contemporary commentators). Subsequent events seem to
have reduced the relative importance of the Bush decision. The terrorist attacks of Sep-
tember 11,2001 reminded citizens that being an American is more important than being a
Democrat or Republican. And empirically, a recount headed up by the Miami Herald
seemed to show that George W. Bush would have won the election even apart from the
Court's decision. Dennis Cauchon & Jim Drinkard, Florida lbw. Errors Cost Gore the Election,
USA TODAY, May 11,2001 at 1A.
to Bugliosi, supra note 1, at 12; McGrory, supra note 1, at AS.
Bugliosi, supra note 1, at 12; McCrory, supra note 1, at A3; see also DEustiowriy, su-
pra note 5, at 50-52 (blaming the decision on political partisanship). Elections in the U.S.
typically present a binary choice, between a Democrat and a Republican. This greatly
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Can judges make objective decisions, free from personal bias?
Can anyone, ever, make any decision free from all bias? After all, a
judge is simply a person, and when they judge, they simply make a
decision, similar in form, if not in content, to any well thought out
decision made by an intelligent person." One major trend in con-
temporary philosophy answers this question with a vociferous "Nor"
This negative view of the possibility of objective decisions is carried
into the legal arena by the Critical Legal Scholars," who also answer
no, and then apply that answer to the practice of law, attempting to
show that in fact judges do not make unbiased decisions. 15
The Critical Legal Scholars' approach, however, is unsatisfying. A
careful reading of their work turns up many more critiques and rants,
than constructive suggestions) 6 At the end of the clay, one may be left.
with only the sickening feeling that all of society and law is a construct
of white male patriarchy, designed to main min the status quo, and
that there is nothing one can do to change that. Although ultimately
unsatisfying, the Critical Legal Scholars are effective when demon-
strating the weaknesses of many of the traditional answers to the ques-
tion of whether a person or a judge can make an unbiased, objective
decision." But still, the reader of the Critical Legal Scholars' writings
is not likely to come away with any sense of what a real judge should
do tomorrow morning when they go to work and are required to de-
cide their next case. 18
clarifies the possible biases for a judge's choice in situations where the judge's choice will
favor one party over the other.
12 See Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 VALE
L.J. 1, 65 (1984) (debunking the myth that judges have an advantage over ordinary people
while making decisions).
13 See e.g., Richard Rorty, The Banality of Pragmatism and the Poetry of justice, 63 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1811 (1990); Singer, supra note 12, at 4.
14 Critical Legal Studies is a very diverse movement, if it can even be termed a move-
ment. Some common tenets include a rejection of traditional hierarchy, concern for mar-
ginalized groups, especially racial minorities and women, and often radical proposals for
addressing these situations. Sec Singer. supra note 12, at 5, 67-70. For an interesting, al-
though now somewhat dated, collection of representative pieces, see Duncan Kennedy &
Karl E. Klare, A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies, 94 YALE L.J. 461, 461-62 (1984).
15 See Singer, supra note 12, at 25-26.
113 Sec Kennedy & Klare, supra note 14.
17 Ronald Dworkin represents one traditional approach to these questions, sometimes
identified as a variation of natural law theory. Critical Legal Scholars have, for example,
criticized Dworkin's reliance on rational consensus to justify his theory of society and law.
See Singer, supra note 12, at 3511.112.
18 See id. at 52, 59. Singer, for example, argues for a substantive program to nihilism,
which under other circumstances might be laughable, based simply on the definition of
the word nihilism. See id.
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A person seeking positive and constructive answers to the prob-
lems of objectivity must, accordingly, turn to another philosophy. This
alternate must address the weaknesses of traditional philosophy which
have been highlighted by the Critical Legal Scholars.° It must ac-
count for the fact that many people, and many judges, do not make
unbiased decisions. And it must provide hope for a successful ap-
proach to objective, unbiased decision making. If it cannot do these
things, then the seeker is no better off than if he or she had converted
to nihilism, as some Critical Legal Scholars have proposed. 20
 The phi-
losophy of Bernard Lonergan, however, provides just such a construc-
tive approach.
Bernard Lonergan lived from 1904-1984. His major works in-
cluded Method in Theology and the monumental Insight. 21 Despite his
prominence in general philosophical circles, Lonergan's work has
been underused in the more specific area of legal philosoph): 22
 This
may be because Lonergan himself never wrote specifically about the
legal arena, and in fact used the law as an example only rarely. 25
 Lon-
ergan's answer to the question of how people should make objective
decisions is, however, a rich, well-rounded approach, well suited to
decision making in the legal arena, 24
 This Note will introduce Loner-
gan into the legal context by comparing his approach to objectivity
with that of Ronald Dworkin.
Ronald Dworkin is a thinker and writer, well known in the area of
legal philosophy, who has constructed a positive answer to the ques-
tion of objectivity.25
 He provides his most complete explanation of his
to These weaknesses include problems in making sense of human Mica -actions, in ex-
plaining (or even affirming the possibility of) meaningful dialogue, and, more importantly
for this Note, a total denial of classical objectivity. See RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND
THE MIRROR or NATuRE 335 (1979); Singer, supra note 12, at 25-26.
2° Singer, supra note 12, at 7-8.
21
 BERNARD LONERGAN, INSIGHT: A S'IlIDY OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (Frederick E.
Crowe & Robert M. Doran eds., Univ. Toronto Press 1992) (1957) [hereinafter LONERGAN.
INSIGHT]; BERNARD LONERGAN, METII0D IN THEOLOGY (1971) [hereinafter LONERGAN.
METHOD],
21
 But see Patrick Brennan, Realizing the Rule of Law in the Human Subject, 43 B.C. L. REV.
227 (2002); Anthony j. Fejfar, Insight into Lawyering: Bernard Lonergan's Critical Realism Ap-
plied to Jurisprudence, 27 B.C. L. REV. 681 (1986).
23
 See Brennan, supra note 22, at 263.
24
 Lonergan's work may be classified as neo-Scholasticism, he drew on the legacy of
Aquinas and Aristotle, but with different emphases and a broad understanding of modern
science, mathematics, philosophy, and religion. See id.
25
 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN, LAW'S Ent-
PIRE]; Ronald Dworkin, Pragmatism. Right Answers and True Banality, in PRAGMA'I1SM IN LAW
AND SOCIETY (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991).
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thinking on this question in Law's Empire. 26 Dworkin approaches the
question of objective decision making specifically within the legal con-
text, but ultimately tackles many of the same questions as both the
Critical Legal Scholars and Lonergan. 27 For this reason, his work
helps to highlight questions in the legal arena which must be an-
swered by Lonergan's philosophy if that philosophy is to succeed, and
to provide a response to the current dominant critique of objectivity
in the law, the Critical Legal Scholars. This Note argues that Loner-
gan's explanation of objective decision making provides a better
model than does Dworkin's explanation, both as an answer to the
Critical Legal Scholars and in the real world of contentious cases.
In working toward the comparison of the two thinkers, Part I ex-
amines Lonergan's model of objectivity to gain familiarity with his
thinking. 28 This necessarily includes an extensive discussion of Loner-
gall's theories of cognitional structure and error, and how these relate
to society. 29 Part II provides a similar examination of Dworkin's theory
of objectivity." This entails a discussion of Dworkin's theory of legal
interpretation, the principle he terms integrity, and the place of each
in the adjudication of legal disputes." Part III compares Lonergan's
and Dworkin's works in the context of Bush v. Gore, in order to apply
Lonergan's answers to the problem of objective decision making to a
practical legal context. 32
I. LONERGAN
Part I will trace Lonergan's arguments, leading up to his explana-
tion of objective decision making, drawing primarily on his seminal
work, Insight." In order to determine if it is ever possible to make an
objective decision, Lonergan first asked, what. am I doing when I
make a decision?34 The answer to this question is a theory of knowing,
which forms the basis of Lonergan's entire philosophy, and underlies
25 See DWoRKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 25, at vii-ix (explaining that Law's Empire
draws together all of Dworkin's prior work in jurisprudence, including, relevant to this
Note, his notorious 'right answers' thesis, into a broad far-reaching description of law and
its place in society).
27 Both authors answer questions about objectivity and the form of proper decision-
making processes. See infra notes 108-144,269-284 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 33-144 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 33-144 and accompanying text.
50 See infra notes 145-284 and accompanying text.
51 Sec infm notes 145-284 and accompanying text.
52 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); infra notes 298-357 and accompanying text.
55 Sec LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 21.
34 See id. at 23.
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his answer to the problem of objective decision making. 35 Even after
knowing the alternatives, an individual must. still decide between
them, so Lonergan further explored what choosing adds to know-
ing." Building on this structure, he explained what error is, how it.
can and does distort the process of decision making in practice, and
how error can be corrected and avoided. 37
 Finally, he answered the
question directly, and delineated a method for making objective
judgments."
A. Cognitional Structure
Lonergan understood human knowing as an activity, intimately
involving the knower, which occurs through a dynamic structure with
three interacting levels." It is not simply "taking a look" at things that
exist outside the person, and then reporting those things, as many of
the major strands of Western philosophy had supposed. 4° This cogni-
tional structure is natural and inherent in everyone, but rarely recog-
nized formally.'"
The first level of this structure is experience. 42
 Experience arises
in a number of forms. 43
 The most commonly recognized forms are
the five senses, but beyond these Lonergan identified many others
including feeling, remembering, and imagining." All provide raw ma-
terial, data, to the knower to be understood. 45
 Without some experi-
" See infra notes 39-79 and accompanying text.
" Sec infra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
37
 See infra notes 80-106 and accompanying text.
" Sec infra notes 108-144 and accompanying text.
sg See LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 21, at 298-99.
4°
 See BERNARD LONERGAN, THE SuBJECT 14-18 (1968). Lonergan criticized Kant,
among others, for taking this too simplistic position. The result of such a position is an
epistemology with too sharp a differentiation between subject and object. Sec id.
41
 Although all human knowing, according to Lonergan, proceeds via this cogitional
structure, it is only by turning the process back upon itself that an individual is able to
formally experience, understand and judge the existence of the structure. It is inapt, Lon-
ergan explained, to conceive of the process of becoming aware of oneself as looking in-
wardly, in the same way that it is inapt to conceive of knowing as looking outwardly. Rather,
knowledge of how one knows must be acquired by the same mechanism as knowledge of
the outside world. Lonergan referred to this process, which he considered to be of central
importance for any person, and especially for anyone attempting to utilize his work, as
"the self-affirmation of the knower." Sec LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 21, at 343-60.
42 See id. at 299,307.
43 Sec id. at 204-14.
" See id.
15 See id. at 96-97.
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ence to draw upon, there is nothing to be understood." Thus experi-
ence is prior to insight."
Experience provides the data that allows for the possibility of an
insight, the second level in Lonergan's theory of knowing," An in-
sight, as the term is used by Lonergan, is the act of catching on, the
moment of understanding information which was previously available
but unintelligible." One key element of insights is that they cannot be
forced, nor can one person have the insight on behalf of another."
They can, however, be encouraged in another person with apt ques-
tions and diagrams. 51 Lonergan reminded his audience that asking a
question is the key to experiencing an insight; if individuals refuse to
ask questions they will be unable to comprehend answers. 52 He aptly
described how people experience a sense of wonder or an innate cu-
riosity, a pre-verbal and even pre-conceptual desire to know, which
leads them to ask questions.53 It is these questions which drive investi-
gation, and investigation in turn provides experiences and culminates
in the act of insight." In fact, this same sense of wonder provides the
foundation for objective judgments. 55
Judgment is the third level, or activity, of knowing; judgment fol-
lows and acts upon insights." The innate curiosity described above is
not content with just any insight; it drives the thinker to find the cor-
rect insight. 57 So judgment consists of reflecting on a prior insight
and asking oneself, is it correct?" One aspect of this judgment is de-
ciding whether one has enough information upon which to base the
judgment. 59 If not, the judgment must be delayed until further perti-
nent questions have been identified, understood, and judged.° The
46 SCCLONERSIAN, INSIGHT, supra note 21, at 298-99,307.
47 Sec id. at 298-99. Lonergan was well acquainted with the work ofJean Piaget, the re-
nowned psychologist, and his work clearly shows Piaget's influence. See generally, LONER-
C.AN, supra note 21, at 193-207; Walter E. Conn. Objectivity—A Developmental and Structural
Analysis: The Epistemologies of Jean Piaget and Bernard Lonergan, 30 DIALEcticA 197 (1976).
49 See LONERGAN, INSIGHT, Supra note 21, at 298-99.
49 See id. at 29.	 •
5° See id. Thus, for Lonergan, knowing (and by extension objectivity) is in the first in-
stance an individual activity. See id.
51 See id.
" See id. at 34.
55 See LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 21, at 34.
54 See id.
55 See infra notes 110-114 and accompanying text.
66 See LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 21, at 297-99.
57 Sec id. at 404.
59 See id. at 298-99.
59 See id. at 404-05.
6° See id. at 297.
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final answer must be yes, no, or I don't know, meaning further ques-
tions are necessary; and yes and no may be qualified as more or less
probable.° 1
 Judgments are communal and public in the sense that any
number of people can affirm the judgment for themselves. 62 Where
several individuals do make the same judgment, the independent
thinkers obviously did not share the exact experience that gave rise to
the understanding that is affirmed in the judgment, rather they too
affirm the truth of the insight behind the judgment."
These three parts of the cognitional structure—experiencing,
understanding, and judging—all presuppose and complement each
other." Experiences without understanding are unintelligible, but
understanding requires experience to act upon." Equally; under-
standing without judgment is meaningless, but judging involves an
intimate interaction with an insight, and through the insight, with ex-
perience."
Insights tend not to occur singly, rather they often occur in com-
plex webs, where an initial insight can trigger the necessary questions
and provide explanatory material that make the next insight much
more likely.67
 Where a system of insights leads to a radically new un-
derstanding of the subject, there arises what Lonergan termed a
higher viewpoint.68
 The insights that allow the higher viewpoint pro-
vide the basis for a rich, broad line of inquiry which transcends the
prior understanding of the subject."
Given this tripartite cognitional structure of experience, insight,
and judgment, and the development of knowledge, Lonergan was
able to describe the relationship between knowing and deciding. 7°
Deciding is an activity that subsumes the structure of knowing in
61
 See LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 21, at 297.
62
 See id. at 197-99,729.
63 See id. at 315. But see Rorty, supra note 19, at 335 [arguing that the word "objective"
only means that the parties agree).
64 See LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 21. at 298.
66
 See id. at 298.
66 See id. at 298.
67
 See id. at 37-38.
6° This is the basis of Lonergan's theory of development. See id. at 37-42.
69 See LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 21, at 37-38. Lonergan explains that there are
ways to engineer the creation of a higher viewpoint. In general, a heuristic structure is a
guide to getting answers, such as the generation of a higher viewpoint or the question that
guides an insight. A method is a fully developed heuristic structure that guides the ques-
tion, anticipates the kind of insight to be expected, and provides a method of verification.
Thus a method provides the form, but not the content, for inquiry which can ultimately
lead to the solution of any problem, including that of general bias. See id. at 67-68.
70 See id. at 636-37,
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much the same way that, within the structure of knowing, judging
subsumes simple understanding, and understanding mere experi-
ence. 71 So in the process of deciding, the decision maker first experi-
ences, understands, and judges the truth or existence of alternative
courses of action." In order to choose between extant alternatives,
however, one must further judge the value of the alternatives," Thus
the decision maker must further experience, understand, and judge
the value of the alternatives before choosing the greatest value. 74
Value, then, is a basic element of deciding." Deciding acids to the
evaluation of a commitment in order to "bring some course of action
into being which, if you do not do it, will not exist.""
By basing all his work on his understanding of cognitional struc-
ture, Lonergan described the process of knowing, from its beginnings
in experience. 77 He traced the transformation of experience into un-
derstanding through insight, and the judgment that asks if the insight
is true or not." Finally, he incorporated this structure of knowing into
a broader structure of deciding, which includes determining the value
of alternate courses of action, and committing to bring the most valu-
able alternative into being,"
B. Error
Although the cognitional structure is the same in each person, it
clearly is not. a static equation that necessarily leads to correct conclu-
sions.84 The world is full of people who, although sharing a single
cognitional structure, make radically different decisions in exactly the
same situations.81 This, however, is not necessarily a bad thing.82 Di-
71
 Deciding is best understood as the fourth level in the cognitional structure, except
that the first three complete the act of knowing, and deciding begins the process of acting
on that knowledge. SCC JOSEPH FLANAGAN, QUEST FOR SELF-KNOWLEDGE: AN ESSAY IN LON-
ERGAN'S PHILOSOPHY 196-97 (1997); LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 21, at 636-37.
72 See FLANAGAN, supra note 71, at 197-98.
72 See id. at 200-01; LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 21, at 636-37.
74 See LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 21. at 624.
75 Sec id. at 624-25.
76 FLANAGAN, supra note 7L at 201. Not only is the new, valuable course of action
brought into being, but the actor is changed as well, she takes more responsibility for her
own being through creating more value in herself and the world around her. See id.
77 See LONERGAN, INSIGHT, slip? note 21, at 96-97.
78 See id. at 298-99.
79 See id. at 636-37.
88 See FLANAGAN, supra note 71, at 107.
61 See LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 21, at 234.
82 Lonergan called for a diversity of ideas, for example, in his description of cosinopo-
lis. Sec id. at 264.
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verse backgrounds and applications of the structure allow for multiple
outcomes, which is one reason why Lonergan understood that a
community is necessary to combat overall decline in society Besides
legitimate differences, however, it is also true that decisions are some-
times made poorly and incorrectly. 84
 As one Lonerganian scholar has
pointed out, "[b]esides the desire to understand, there is also the fear
of understanding."85
 An individual's fear may operate in many ways to
block insight.80
 For example, fear may intrude at the fountainhead of
cognitional activity, by blocking the sense of wonder upon which the
whole activity depends.87
 The individual may not want to understand,
and thus flee from insight. 88
At other times, an individual may prefer him or herself to the
group in such a way as to choose to block out the insights that would
force each to see his or her own selfishness. 89 An entire economic or
racial group within a community may resist changes, either actively or
passively, and so avoid understanding how these changes would actu-
ally improve the community. 99
Lonergan also described the general bias of common sense to-
ward theoretical patterns of knowing. 91
 Although the same cogni-
tional structure described above is found in everyone,92 individual
people according to their needs and practices apply it in various situa-
tions and towards various ends 9 3
 Lonergan noted that there is one
very basic distinction in patterns of knowing that causes a great deal
of trouble. 94
 At certain times, people direct their attention toward sci-
entific, disinterested knowing, and then they anticipate understand-
83 See id. at 263-67. Because absolutely correct knowing, and thus decision making, is
so difficult and time consuming, and modern industrialized societies are enormous and
intricate, it would be impossible for one person to gain expertise in enough areas simulta-
neously to effect an entire society. Thus a community, although not in the traditional sense
of the word, of experts is necessary to effect widespread change. See infra note 378.
84 See LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 21, at 244-45.




9° See LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 21, at 244-47.
9° See id. at 247-50.
91 See id. at 250-51.
97 See id. at 359-60. The structure is described by Lonergan as invariant. See id.
83 See id. at 203.
84 See LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 21, at 200-01. Lonergan detailed a number of
"patterns of knowing" but these two are the important ones for the limited point made
here.
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ing generalizations and technical answers. 95 At other times, people are
interested in common sense knowing, in understanding each imme-
diate situation in a very practical way, and seeking particular and prac-
tical answers.99 As even this summary statement of the different pur-
poses of the two patterns of knowing indicates, the two are comple-
mentary; common sense thinking solves practical immediate prob-
lems, while theoretical knowing generates long-term planning and
describes common-sense situations in helpful ways.97 But in fact the
tension generated between the two patterns often breaks down into
what Lonergan termed general bias." Common sense knowers, be-
cause they are by definition incapable of explanatory introspection,
cannot accept that common sense is a limited field and may often
disparage theoreticians as useless dreamers 99
Unfortunately, when people of common sense disparage theo-
retical knowing the result is often an overall cycle of decline.'" Com-
mon sense, with its focus on immediate, contextual decisions, is Inca-
pable of successfully guiding a society in the long term. 101 The various
individual and group biases described above 102 contribute to shorter
cycles of decline which cause chaos and decay in specific parts of soci-
ety, by restricting and distorting the decision-making processes.'" And
when left unchecked because of the general bias against theory, this
gradual decay can incrementally drag an entire culture into lower
viewpoints and more restrictive horizons. 104 The only answer to this
problem is the creation of a higher viewpoint that will "attack the
problem at its source."'" This higher viewpoint must provide a
95 Sec id. at 198-200. Another way of describing scientific knowing is that it is interested
with the relations between things. Sec id.
96 See id. at 209-01. Common sense knowing is a popular and important subject which
has been explored in the legal literature by a number of scholars including Catharine
Wells, Situated Decisionmaking 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1727 (1990).
97 See FLANAGAN, SI4pia note 71, at 85.
BS See LONERGAN, INSIGHT, Supra note 21, at 251-53.
See FLANAGAN, SttplYZ note 71, at 85,93.
I" See LONERGAN, INSIGHT, SUPla note 21, at 251-53.
"I Sec id. at 251-52. For example, the common sense response to one type of city
planning problem in the 1960s was a complete failure when applied on a broad scale. It
required the creation of a whole new, broader, more integrated theory of urban planning
by Jane Jacobs to create a workable theory and reverse this error. See generally JANE JACOBS,
DEA'Ill AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1994).
102 See generally, LONERGAN, INSIGHT, 5//pra note 21, chs. 6 and 7.
1" See LONERGAN, INSIGHT, SlIpra note 21, at 254.
104 See id.
105 Sec FI.ANAGAN, supra note 71, at 88. For example, Einstein's theory of relativity rep-
resented a higher viewpoint than Newton's theory of gravity. Einstein's work built on and
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method for interpreting history and identifying the sources of the
problems, in individuals, groups, and the society as a whole, and de-
termining what steps can be taken to remedy the problems and re-
verse the cycle of decline. 10°
C. Objectivity
Finally, we can approach Lonergan's definition of objectivity by
synthesizing the previously introduced concepts. This definition of
objectivity will utilize and combine the cognitional structure and the
explanation of error set out above. 07
 Objectivity is first, merely put-
ting aside passions, prejudices, and biases.m And second, objectivity is
simply making true judgments and decisions. 159
In the first sense, it is the unrestricted desire to know which
drives and guides objectivity."° This desire is unlimited, it drives peo-
ple, ultimately, to search for correct answers to every possible ques-
tion.'" Because this desire strains toward the answers to all questions,
it drives the process of intellectual development." 2
 Because it is ori-
ented toward only correct judgments, it guides the process of self-
improvement.'" Lonergan captured this sense of objectivity when he
wrote, "[T]o be objective ... is to give free rein to the pure desire, to
its questions for intelligence, and to its questions for reflection."" 4
The desire to know may, however, be distorted by biases of ego-
tism or fear." 5
 A bias may be either personal, or may result from
membership in a group or society. 115
 As to personal biases, the solu-
tion is to work to eliminate them through a constant process of im-
provement. 117
 These biases must be pruned through introspection
and comparison with the best self the knower can imagine for him-
incorporated many of Newton's insights, but ultimately transcended them. See ALBERT
EINSTEIN, RELATivrry 135-57 (Robert W. Lawson, trans. 1961).
106 See LONERGAN, INSIGHT, SUM note 21, at 258-59,
107 See supra notes 39-106, and accompanying text.
108 See LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 21, at 404. This corresponds roughly with what
Lonergan termed normative objectivity. See id.
109 See id. at 402. This corresponds roughly with what Lonergan termed absolute objec-
tivity. See id.
lo See id. at 404.
in Sec id,
112 see id.
us See LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 21, at 404-05.
114 See id. at 404.
I" See id. at 247-50.
rte See Id. at 244-50.
117 See id. at 618-56.
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self. 115 Each bias must be identified, eliminated, replaced with a
proper or true insight or web of insights, and all the branchings and
effects of the bias must be searched out and reversed." 9 As each is
successfully dealt with, the knower's ability to conceive of himself as
potentially perfect may improve, leading to further discoveries of bias
and further self-improvement. 120 The only alternative to this strict
regimen of attention and work is to allow oneself to sink downward
into a personal cycle of meaningless chaos."'
As to group and cultural biases, a similar framework of attention
and effort. is required. k 22 Just as the individual is juxtaposed against his
or her own potential perfection, the culture as a whole and in its vari-
ous parts must be evaluated against the ideal society, what a society
would look like if all correct decisions were made. 123 The society must
be analyzed in terms of various areas of progress or decline. 124 Areas
of decline must be identified, their effects studied, and corrections
made, both on the individual level and on the public level. 125 Because
the scope of a modern society is so enormous, a meaningful critique
of this sort requires many people, perhaps including experts in his-
tory, psychology, politics, economics, spirituality, law, and philosophy,
to collabora te."9
People making objective judgments must also account for the
bias common sense decision makers have against theory and anything
that has no practical effect, which Lonergan termed the general
bias. 127 Lonergan saw this general bias against theoretical knowing as
a terribly invidious and widespread problem. 129 It is both positive and
negative; it rationalizes as well as blinds. 129 Despite the outline pro-
vided for the correction of error, the struggle against the blandish-
ments and lies propagated by errors is long-term and lacks a clear
119 See LoNERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 21, at 500-02.
119 See LONERGAN, MI7111011, supra note 21, at 44.
120 See id. This is the self-transcendent principle which serves as the bedrock for all of
Lonergan's work.
121 See Id.. at 231. Of course, most people fall in between the extremes, they do improve
themselves more or less constantly, and yet probably no one is perfectly able to avoid all
bias.
122 See id. at 94.
12!
	 LON 2:RGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 21, at 265-66.
124 Sec Id.
125 See LONERGAN, IsICHIOD, supra note 21, at 44.
126 See LoNERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 21, at 266.
127
 Sce id. at 250-51.
128 See id. at 258. 266-67.
129 See id. at 253.
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standard for victory.'" There are, besides, further difficulties as Lon-
ergan comments in Insight, "[b]eneath [this problem] lies the almost
insoluble problem of settling clearly and exactly what the general bias
is. It is not a culture but only a compromise that results from taking
the highest common factor of an aggregate of cultures. 931 As a result,
Lonergan called for the sort of collaboration mentioned above; a
broad-based effort, composed of many experts working in community,
and with only a long-term hope for success.'"
In the second sense, objectivity is simply making true judgments
and decisions. 133
 A judgment is absolutely objective if all the questions
that could possibly be asked about the insight that is being judged
have been satisfactorily answered. 134 In non-ideal situations, absolutely
objective judgments do not often occur. 135 Rather, judges must, in the
interest of proceeding with life, content themselves with answering a
restricted range of further pertinent questions."° This results in a
provisional judgment." 7
 Of course, deciding which questions are per-
tinent requires a correct judgment as well, and so on. 138 Because the
desire to know is never satisfied, even these provisional judgments will
be reexamined from time to time, checked against new judgments,
and eventually incorporated into a higher viewpoint. 139
 The judg-
ments will be incorporated in a way that affirms the validity of the
previous judgment, but offers a new explanation, a new spin, or a
broader context in which to place the earlier judgment. 14° Or the
provisional judgments may be reevaluated and found wanting, to be
replaced by a better judgment, one which incorporates a broader web
of related insights or satisfies a greater number of criteria.l " 1
Lonergan delineated his basic approach. to objectivity simply in
four transcendental precepts, "Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reason-
able, Be responsible." 142
 According lo Lonergan, to ignore these pre-
13° See id. at 266.
131 See LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 21, at 266-67.
132 See id. at 266. Lonergan termed this community of the mind cosmopolis. See id. at
263-67.
133
 See id. at 175.
134 See id. at 402. This particular sort of objectivity is only realized in transcendent sub-
jects according to Lonergan. See id.
m See id. at 402-03.
136 See LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supus note 21, at 404-05.
137 See id.
138 See id. at 370.
132 See id. at 493-94.
14° See id. at 493-96.
141 See LONEAGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 21, at 493-96.
142 See LONERGAN, METHOD, supra note 21, at 53. The quote continues:
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cepts is to condemn oneself and ultimately one's entire society to de-
cline. 143 To practice them is to become a wise knower and an objective
decision maker—a true progressive. 144
II, DWORKIN
Ronald Dworkin is one of the preeminent contemporary Anglo-
American legal philosophers. 145 As such, he provides a respected, ar-
ticulate, and complex contra position against which to apply Loner-
gan's work to the philosophy of law. Thus, Part II builds up to an ex-
planation of Dworkin's approach to objective decision making.
Ronald Dworkin, in his book Law's Empire, promulgated a theory
of law—what it is and how society does and should utilize it. 146 In do-
ing so, he considered many of the relevant issues that. Lonergan dealt.
with. 147 Still, because of the specific nature of Dworkin's work it is
necessary in many cases to draw these broader, underlying concepts
out of Dworkin's notes, and to delve into the theoretical implications
and assumptions which stand behind his arguments, 148
This exploration of Law's Empire begins by examining the dis-
agreements in the philosophy of law which exist just beneath the sur-
face of the everyday practical workings of the law. 149 Some of the most
common topics of this debate are the questions, "Do judges make law?
And should they?" 1 " In order to answer these questions, Dworkin
suggests we must first. explore, in broad terms, what exactly judges are
doing when they judge. 151 Dworkin answers this question by proposing
his theory of interpretation, which applies his implicit theory of cog-
Being attentive includes attention to human affairs. Being intelligent includes
a grasp of hitherto unnoticed or unrealized possibilities. Being reasonable in-
cludes the rejection of what probably would not work but also the acknowl-
edgment of what probably would. Being responsible includes basing one's
decisions and choices on an unbiased evaluation of short-term and long-term
costs and benefits to oneself, to one's group, to other groups.
See id.
145 See hi. at 53-55.
144 See id. at 53.
145 See PAUL GAFFNEY, RONALD DWORKIN ON LAW AS INTEGRITY: RIGHTS AS PRINCIPLES
OF ADJUDICATION 1 (1996).
146 See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 25, at vii-ix.
147 For example, he addressed questions of interpretation, objectivity (in the form of
"right answers"), and other issues of general philosophy. See id.
148 See e.g., id. at 425-28 n.23-27.
149 See id. at 6.
155 See id. at 6-11,
151 See infra notes 157-192 and accompanying text.
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nition to legal decisionrnaking. 152 Second, Dworkin delves into the
question of what principles should and do guide judges when making
decisions.' 53
 Dworkin proposes his principle of integrity to mediate
between justice, fairness and due process, and allow decision makers
greater flexibity. 154
 Third, Dworkin attempts a theoretical, but descrip-
tive, justification of the concrete decisions the legal system makes eve-
ryday. 155
 Filially, this justification is extended into a theory of objectiv-
ity, which explains why people should accept judges' pronounce-
men ts. 156
A. Creative Intopretation
Disagreement and debate about the law can be carried on de-
spite widely differing conceptual frameworks because, Dworkin
claims, the debates are all aimed at interpreting the same concrete set
of social practices, namely the behavior of actual judges, and the exis-
tence and observable effects of statutes and judicial opinions. 157
 Un-
derstanding the sort of interpretation that commonly occurs in these
debates is therefore a key element for Dworkin in developing a theory
of law. 158
 Toward this end, Dworkin noted that people use several dif-
fering interpretive schemes, depending on the context. 159 The most
common is conversational interpretation, interpreting the sounds or
marks other people make to convey meaning. 164
 Others include sci-
entific interpretation, artistic interpretation, and social interpreta-
tion. 161
 He characterized the interpretation that lawyers participate in
as the interpretation of social practices, or social interpretation.w2
Dworkin described social interpretation, along with artistic interpreta-
tion, as creative because both aim to interpret something created by
people (arguably unlike scientific interpretation) and yet distinct
from the individual (unlike conversation). 163
162 See infra notes 157-192 and accompanying text.
163 See infra notes 193-241 and accompanying text.
154
 See infra notes 193-265 and accompanying text.
166 See infra notes 242-265 and accompanying text.
1" See infra notes 269-284 and accompanying text.
167 See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 25, at 46.
158 See id. at 50.
158 See id.
16° See id.
161 See id. These distinctions are similar to the distinctions Lonergan drew between
theoretical and common sense knowing. See supra notes 91-106 and accompanying text.
162 See DWORKIN, Law's E5IPIRE, supra note 25, at 50.
163 See id. In general philosophical terms, this might be restated as: interpreting con-
versation involves understanding a subject as object, while interpreting art or social prac-
tice involves understanding only an object.
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Creative interpretation is central to Dworkin's argument.'" First,
artistic interpretation is necessarily constructive, as opposed to being
simply another instance of the conversational method. 105 Conversa-
tional method tries to discover the intention of the author or speaker,
but creative interpretation tries to interpret the work (or social prac-
tice) as the best possible example of its genre.m
Dworkin described several basic steps in this creative interpreta-
tion.'" The first step is pre-interpretive, where the interpreter decides
on the broad outline or definition of what is to be interpreted; for
example, deciding which social custom to interpret, and what that
social custom is.' 68 Even this first. step may entail a certain amount of
interpretation, as customs do not sort themselves nicely into manage-
able categories.' 69 The second step is to value the work or custom be-
ing interpreted; why that custom, in general, is worth pursuing. 17° Fi-
nally, there is a post-interpretive, or reforming, stage during which the
interpreter will adjust, or suggest adjustments to, certain specifics of
the practice or work in order to make the custom work better, or be-
come more valuable. 17 '
To capture the foregoing definition in a practical example,
Dworkin proposes that the interpretation of law, or any other social
practice, is analogous to a chain novel wherein a subsequent author
constructs each chapter. 172 Each author takes responsibility for con-
structing the next chapter in such a way that it represents the best in-
terpretation and continuation of the novel as a whole.'” Each author,
although not formally constrained, is practically limited by two con-
siderations.' 74 First, the author is limited by basic fit; for example, a
romance novel cannot suddenly be transformed into a physics text-
book.' 75 Second, where more than one interpretation makes sense,
the author must choose the one which best suits the work as a
whole.' 76 A variety of factors, including both textual (or procedural in
t" See id.
163 See id. at 52.
166 See id.
to See DwoRKIN , LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 25, at 65.
taa Sec id. at 65-66.
169 See id. at 66.
170 Sec id.	 '
171 See id.
172 See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 25, at 228-29.
173 See id.
174 See id. at 230-31.
170 See id. at 230.
176 See id. at 231-32.
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the legal context) and aesthetic (substantive) will have to be consid-
ered."7
One common objection to this view of interpretation is that in-
terpretation, especially artistic interpretation, is really about recover-
ing the author's intent in producing the work, not constructing it. 178
Construction is always subjective, the objection goes, and what is
needed is an objective understanding of the author's intent.t 79
Dworkin replies that the recovery of original intent is an extremely
complex, and ultimately problematic, concept. 18° The author may be
dead or may have changed his views, or the author may have intended
the work for a particular audience who would have understood it in a
way not accessible to the current audience. 181
 The complexities are so
great, in fact, that they necessarily result in ambiguities for the consci-
entious interpreter, choices wherein she has no guidance except that
she hopes to interpret the work in the most valuable light possible. 182
Further complexities arise in the context of interpreting social
customs, such as law. 188
 When there is no clear author, for whose in-
tendon is the interpreter searching? 184
 The answer cannot be the in-
terpreter's own intention, because the underlying point of the overall
objection to Dworkin's understanding of creative interpretation is
that his theory is subjective, so the answer must be outside the inter-
preter. 188
 The intention of any single member of the social group will
be equally subjective, however, and attempts to find an intention
common to all the members of the group are likely to fail, particularly
if the custom in question is very important or powerful. 188 Dworkin
briefly discusses finding the intention of the group as a unity or a su-
perentity, but concludes that even if such a thing were possible, the
177 See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, SUpEa note 25, at 234.
178 See id. at 55.
179 See id.
18° See id. at 55-56.
18 ' See id. at 55-59. Dworkin uses the example of Shakespeare's Shylock, noting that a
contemporary director would probably have to rearrange the character if she were to
evoke in a contemporary audience the reaction Shakespeare's audience would have had.
See id. at 55-56.
' 1'2 See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 25, at 58-59,
I" See id. at 62.
184
 Sec id. at 62-63.
115 See id.
188 Sec id. at 63-64.
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result would simply be one more subjective opinion to be evaluated
and debated. 187
Another option is for the interpreter to generalize. 188 By raising
the explanation of the social custom to the proper level of generality,
the interpreter can include most if not all of the widely varying mem-
bers of the group whose social practice is being studied. 189
 This, how-
ever, is still not the same as creating a linguistic foundation for the
social practice. 190 The interpreter's general interpretation stands open
to challenge, and it applies only to a specific time and community. 191
Because there is no real alternative to this conversational model of
interpretation, Dworkin asserts that his interpretive theory is the only
available system for explaining and interpreting social practices,I 92
B. The ninciple of Integrity
Dworkin next applies this interpretive theory to the field of
law. 193 He begins by describing judges as interpreters of a social prac-
tice, as discussed above. 194 As with the producer of a play or the
author of a chain novel, judges normally take part in the process
rather than simply criticizing it.' 95 Each judge's interpretive method
depends on what he or she sees as the value of the entire system. 196
Rather than leading to an unintelligible dispersion of interpretations,
however, the combined pressures of various core concepts that every
interpretation must account for, the pressures of living within an ac-
tual society, and the custom of relying on precedent. (which includes
other judges' interpretive theories) help to unify judges. 197
192 See DWORKIN, Law's EMPIRE, supra note 25, at 64-65,422 n.15. The concept of the
superentity, however, looks rather similar to Dworkin's core concept of personification. Sec
infra notes 214-218 and accompanying text.




192 See id. at 86.
193 See DwouKIN , Law's EMPIRE, supra note 25, at 87.
194 See id.
1 ' See id.
199 See id. at 88.
197 See id. Because governments use collective force to further their aims, Dworkin stig.
gests that the primary aim of legal practice is to restrict government. "Law insists that force
not be used or withheld, no matter how useful that would be to ends in view, no matter
how beneficial or noble these ends, except as licensed or required by individual rights and
responsibilities flowing from past political decisions about when collective force is
justified." Judges are active participants in this process. Sec id. at 93.
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On the other side, a number of factors tend to force divergence
among judges. These include the variety of ideological commitments
that judges bring to the bench, the dynamics of the interpretive proc-
ess, and differing conceptions of core ideas such as justice and fair-
ness. 198
 Although too wide a divergence in one generation would
promote chaos and disintegration, too much similarity would stagnate
the system, according to Dworkin. 199
One of the most important unifying factors is the judges' com-
mitment to certain principles, with which each decision must be in
accord. 20° Dworkin introduces integrity as one of the four major prin-
ciples of our political system, setting it alongside the commonly rec-
ognized principles of justice, fairness, and procedural due process. 201
These four principles form the core of our political system and pro-
vide the major unifying force behind legislatures and courts, and
among the various legislators and judges. 202
 They provide stability and
guidelines for judges as they interpret the social practice we call law. 203
Dworkin divides integrity into two important aspects. One aspect
is political integrity, which requires that those creating the law work to
keep it coherent in principle. 204
 The second aspect is adjudicative in-
tegrity, which requires that those applying the law make decisions
which are coherent with the past, and coherent with the whole scope
of the law, not piece by piece. 2°5
It is important to note immediately that integrity is not simply
consistency. 206
 Integrity may require a departure from a previous prac-
tice, which consistency would require upheld, if the practice is found
to contradict a principle. 207
 Because integrity calls for consistency in
principle, not in policy, it is possible that the best interpretation of a
principle may call for differing policies in differing situations. 2°8
Dworkin provides two criteria for judging integrity which are, in
fact, the same criteria used in any creative interpretation: does it fit
198 See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 25, at 88.
199
 See id. at 89.
290 See id. at 225.
201 See id. at 164-65.
282 See id. at 87-88.
2°3 Sec DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 25, at 87-88. This might be restated
more general terms as: these are principles that provide guidelines for determining the
value of the alternatives.
284 See id. at 167. This duty effects judges, legislators and bureaucrats at various times as
they carry out their duties. See id.
888 See id.
208
 See id. at 219-20.
207
 See id.
208 See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 25, at 219-20.
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our politics and does it reveal our politics in the best light ? 209 Integrity
does fit our politics, because only the assumption that political deci-
sion makers value integrity explains why, for example, we do not allow
checkerboard statutes (e.g., a criminal law that applies only to arrests
made every other Friday), or apply equal protection in a specific in-
stance only to people born in even years. 21° Integrity is also attractive,
because it often prevents inefficiencies and provides a theory which
gives protection against arbitrary and deceitful practices. 211 Integrity
also heightens the responsibility that individual citizens feel toward
their political system insofar as their own interactions fall within the
scope of this same integrity. 212 It is attractive, however, only if we ac-
cept. Dworkin's argument for personification of a moral agent. 218
The law as integrity argument is dependent upon Dworkin's as-
sumption that a community can be treated as a single unit, or per-
sonified, and can thus be committed, in a sense similar to an individ-
ual, to a principle like integrity as a unity. 214 The idea of per-
sonification allows Dworkin to assert that the community actually is
committed to the principle of integrity despite individual denials of
the principle or refusals to act with integrity.215 Dworkin defends per-
sonification through a common-sense example. If an automobile
company's cars were found to be defective, and a thorough inquiry
determined that in fact no individual employee or officer was guilty of
any negligence in designing or building the cars, who should bear the
burden of replacing the defective cars?216 If we treat the company as a
whole as a moral agent, we can blame the company, apart from, and
prior to, any individual.217 Dworkin describes actual examples of per-
sonification at work in the guilt contemporary white Americans feel
toward the descendants of slaves, and Germans for Holocaust survi-
vors, for example, 218
One important feature of integrity is that it is a real-world princi-
ple. 219 In a perfect world, integrity would not be needed because
209 See id. at 176.
21° See id. at 184-85.
211 Sec id. at 188-89.
212 Sec id.
215 See DwomtiN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 25, at 187.
2H See id. at 167-68.
215 See id. at 167,172.
216 See id. at 169-71.
217 Sec id. at 170.
218
 Sec DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, SI/Pra note 25, at 172-73.
219 Sec id. at 176.
846	 Boston College Law Review 	 'Vol. 44:825
every political decision would be perfectly just and fair. 22° But where
conflicts develop, where choices must be made between fairness and
justice, integrity exists as another consideration that may provide a
legitimate reason to tip the balance one way or the other. 221 In fact,
Dworkin defends integrity because its adoption allows his argument
for the legitimacy of our community to succeed. 222
The principle of integrity underpins Dworkin's theory of the
moral justification of the law. 223
 What justification is there for the co-
ercive effects of the law, and of political force in general, upon indi-
viduals? A political system that includes the principle of integrity has a
better claim to this legitimacy than a political system without integrity
according to Dworkin's description of socie ty.224
Dworkin describes society as a community comprised of associa-
tive obligations.225 Several conditions are necessary to give rise to
these obligations in any meaningful sense. The members of the com-
munity must accept, at least in a pre-interpretive sense, the structure
of what obligations it is that they will jointly undertake. 22° The mem-
bers of the group must understand that these obligations are special,
owed only to the other members of the group and not owed in the
same sense to outsiders. 227
 The associative obligations are also per-
sonal, they run from individual to individual, not merely to the group
as a whole.228
 Finally, the obligations also require personal concern
for other members of the group, and that concern must be equal to-
ward all members.229
Dworkin terms this the principled model of community. 23° In the
principled community, people view their associations as driven, at
root, by a shared set of principles, like the four noted above, which
result in various more or less satisfactory practices."' Which princi-
ples should be included is considered a serious question for debate in
this model. 232
 The members accept their obligations as arising from
226 See id.
221 Sec id. at 177.
222 See id. at 188-89. Dworkin relies heavily on the community's acceptance of integrity
in building his theory of the legitimacy of coercion. See id. at 190-92.
222 See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 25, at 190.
224 See id. at 192.
225 See id. at 195-97.
226 See id. at 198.
227 See id. at 199.
228
 See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 25, at 199.
229
 See id. at 199-201.
21° See id. at 211.
251 See id. at 210-11.
252 Sec id.
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their shared history, even while working to more fully implement
their chosen principles. 233
The principled model, Dworkin asserts, is the best possible model
for a "morally pluralistic society.'' 234 The principled understanding of
our community justifies the exercise of "hare power" by the state, de-
spite the incredible diversity among our citizens. 235 It is worth noting
that merely because the community is principled does not guarantee
that it is just. 23° There may come a time in the life of the community
when the demands of justice override even the community's obliga-
tion to the principle of integrity. 237 But at least the principled model
allows for the possibility of a legitimate and just community. 238
The principled model, although it has been described as a good
fit with our society's actual practices, does not claim to cover every
example of actual practice. 239 There are cases where actual practice
opposes principles that society has agreed upon, and this model con-
demns such as breaches of integrity. 24° Because no generation starts
with a clean slate, but rather breaks in upon an historical stage already
cluttered, justice and fairness will at times conflict with integrity, and
individual decision makers must in those cases decide which principle
is best suited to the situation."'
C. Integrity in Adjudication
Dworkin demonstrates how judges should make these difficult
decisions in his explanation of the adjudicative side of integrity.242
Law as integrity rejects the dualist proposal that judges either find or
make law when they decide cases,243 Applying the principle of integ-
rity, judges attempt to interpret the law as though it were expressing
the principles of a single personified viewpoint?'" The flip side of this
position is that these decisions should be regarded as valuable only if
299
	 DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 25, at 210-11.
234 Sec id. at 213-14.
235 See id. at 214-15.
236 Sec id. al 202.
237 See id.
238 See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 25, at 215.
239 See id. at 217.
240 See id.
241 See id.
242 See id. at 225-26.
243 See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 25, at 225.
244 See id.
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they represent the best interpretation of the principles of justice, fair-
ness, procedural due process, and integrity. 245
Integrity does not require that a judge's decision be consistent
with all historical forms of principles. 246
 Where a society has aban-
doned a certain historical interpretation of justice, the judge is not
required to maintain integrity with the historical interpretation 
. 247
Integrity is only required contemporaneously, across the various areas
of law. 248
 The effect of history in law as integrity is limited by its con-
temporary focus and integrity does not try to capture the intent of
historical figures, for example.249
 History does retain a place in
Dworkin's theory of law, however, because an understanding of his-
tory is necessary to evaluate the legitimacy the scheme of principles
that gave rise to current laws. 25°
To illustrate his theory, Dworkin creates a mythical judge, named
Hercules, and describes the steps he would take in deciding a com-
plex and difficult case to provide a narrative example of how his prin-
cipled theory of integrity would be utilized in practice. 251 Dworkin
describes Hercules as a judge of inhuman patience and superhuman
intelligence, who has an entire career to devote to a single case. 252
Dworkin is also careful to point out, while describing Hercules, that
law as integrity is intended to describe an approach, a method of ask-
ing questions, personified by Hercules, and the answers are variable
depending on the specific problem. 253
Hercules begins by attempting to form a coherent theory which
explains the past decisions of the issue at hand.254
 He first generates a
list of possible interpretations which would account for the prior deci-
sions.255
 Next, he tests these theories by asking whether a hypothetical
individual official, acting as the personification of the community, and
245 See id.
246 See id. at 227.
247 See id.
246 See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 25, at 227.
249 See id. at 227.
25° Sec id. at 227-28.
251 See id. at 238-58.
252 Sec id. at 239, Dworkin acknowledges the unrealistic characteristics of Hercules. See
id.
253 See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 25, at 239. Lonergan's work deals exten-
sively with the concept of method, a structure that guides questioning, but doesn't dictate
the content of a decision. Cf. LONERGAN, METHOD, supra note 21, at 4-25. Also, note the
similarities between Hercules' decisionmaking process and Lonergan's process, supra notes
70-79 and accompanying text.
2" See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 25, at 240.
259 See id.
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coining to coherent decisions, could have used any of these theo-
ries. 256 Theories that clearly fail this test are rejected. 257
Hercules proceeds by expanding his inquiry into more general
fields of law. 258 He tests each remaining theory to see if it could be
understood as expressing a principle which justifies the entire legal
system.258 Of course a finite judge would be unable to pursue this sort
of inquiry to its ultimate conclusion, but would be able to approxi-
mate it both through a wise understanding of the law and more lim-
ited research confined to a certain department of the law. 26° If only
one theory remains, well and good, Hercules' job is done. 261
If the results are divided, though, either more than one theory
still fits, or no theory adequately explains the entirety, Hercules must
move to the second aspect of interpretation. 262 He must attempt to
determine which theory shows all the prior work, or decisions, of the
personified community in its best light. 263 In order to do this, he will
have to consider both his own and his community's perceptions of
justice and fairness, and balance those against integrity.264 In the end,
Hercules makes his decision, and announces it as law. 265
D. Objectivity
Dworkin's view of objectivity underlies his description of judging
and what he believes is necessary to justify judicial decision making. 266
Unlike Lonergan, however, Dworkin's theory of objectivity does not
seem to be constructed from other elements of his theories. 267 Rather,
Dworkin's judicial objectivity is, at least ostensibly, simply the applica-
tion of a common sense, descriptive view of objectiv 4268
Because Dworkin's overall philosophical views are commonly
seen as a variation of natural law theory, he is often accused of relying
256 See id.
257 See id.
258 See id. at 245.
259 See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 25, at 245.
28° See id. at 245-46.
261 See id. at 246.
262 See id. at 246-47.
285 See id. at 248-49.
261 Set DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 25, at 249.
265 See id.
266 For example, in Law's Empire, Dworkin's brief explicit discussion of objectivity is
placed within the section on interpretation. See id. at 79-83.
267 Compare Lonergan's theory of objectivity, supra notes 108-144 and accompanying
text, with Dworkin's theory. infra notes 274-277 and accompanying text.
268 See infra notes 274-277 and accompanying text. Dworkin's theory may seem some-
what uncritical as a result of his reliance on common sense.
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on an outdated philosophical concept of reality, one in which there is
a "really real" world 269 of meaning and ultimate truth somewhere out
there beyond the everyday world waiting to be discovered, like New-
ton's ether. 2" Dworkin, however, denies this charge and sets out his
theory of objectivity in contrast to this classic natural law explana-
tion.2" As a preliminary matter, he notes that it is absurd to claim that
there are no right views, for then the person holding the view that
there are no right views cannot herself he holding a right view. 272
Dworkin's view of objectivity avoids both this absurdity and the
classic natural law explanatitin of objectivity. 2" He explains that when
he says something is objectively right, he is not referring to some elu-
sive reality which is the source of truth. 274 Rather he is saying that it is
his belief that X is true, and that such a statement must always be
backed up with sound arguments from policy, experience, or logic. 275
So for Dworkin the difference between "I like vanilla ice cream" and
"I think that objectively speaking vanilla ice cream possesses greater
value than any other flavor" is merely that the first refers to one's own
taste, and so stands alone as a true statement, and the second pur-
ports to be true for everyone, and therefore requires that convincing
evidence be presented.276 Thus, objective language for Dworkin is no
more than a shortcut for claiming that good reasons exist why he be-
269
 The term "really real" is sometimes used in philosophy to denote the difference be-
tween the world as it is commonly perceived by human beings, the real world, and the
world which can be proven to exist apart from human beings and exists in theory, the
really real world. See LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 21, at 323.
2" See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 25, at 262-63. Newton. at a loss to explain
the concept of empty space, posited an ether (a field of mechanical corpuscles), so far
undetected, which gave space its boundaries and prevented space from being empty. See
THOMAS S. KUHN, TIIE STRUCTURE or SciEN-rim REvourrtoNs 72-74 (1962).
271 In the classic natural law view, objectivity is correctly reporting what is "out there."
Dworkin's very similar view has been extensively criticized by some 'postmodern' thinkers
(including Rorty and Singer). Some of this criticism argues that it is impossible to discover
what is really out there, since human beings are so heavily influenced by a mass of factors,
like race, gender, and family background, which constantly skew all attempts at classic ob-
jectivity. Because there is no one who can stand outside these influences and judge be-
tween opposing ideas, it is impossible to prove that one idea is "objectively" better than
another. Rather, opposing ideas can only be judged to be different. See DWORKIN, LAW'S
EMPIRE, supra note 25, at 78-80, 262-63 (restating and replying to some critiques of this
sort).
272 See id. at 373.
2" See id. at 80-81.
274 see id
276 See id. at 81. This response relies on the likelihood of rational consensus amongst
subjects, which Singer, for example, denies. See Singer, supra note 12, at 35-38.
276
 Sec DwomuN, LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 25, at 81.
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Neves a particular statement should be true for everybody, or is the
best choice in a given situation.277
Nevertheless, Dworkin's theory of creative interpretation pro-
vides the rough outline of a method of questioning that results in
more correct decisions by judges, and is thus similar in its effects to
what Lonergan termed objectivity. 278 Under his theory, Dworkin ex-
pects judges to make decisions based on their determination of which
choice will result in greater value for the community. 279
 Value in the
legal context is judged in light of the four principles—justice, fairness,
procedural due process and integrity—that provide the unifying force
behind the community's practice of law. 288 Thus, the outcome that
can be interpreted as best achieving these four principles is the most
valuable, and should be chosen."' The process of evaluation is ac-
complished by first  generating a list of possible interpretations, then
checking for rough fit in light of the four principles, and finally com-
paring whatever options remain and choosing the one that provides
the most attractive understanding of the previous cases. 282 According
to Dworkin, this process will yield the "right answer"283 (as he has ex-
plained it) in a given case. 284
III. ANALYSIS
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore pro-
vides an excellent real world scenario against which to distinguish
Dworkin and Lonergan's approaches to objectivity. 285 In Bush v. Gore
the Supreme Court settled the 2000 presidential election on Decem-
ber 12, 2000. 286 A total of six opinions, including one concurring and
four dissenting, were issued as the Court reversed and remanded the
Florida Supreme Court's decision. 287 The Court's decision prevented
277 See id.
278 Cf. supra notes 133-144 and accompanying text (explaining Lonergan's theory of
objectivity) .
279 See DWCIKIN, LAW'S LMPIRE, supra note 25, at 59-60,65-66,
289 See id. at 164-66.
281 See id. at 225-26.
282 See id. at 238-58.
263
 In light of the foregoing explanation, it seems that what Dworkin has termed the
"right answers" thesis, one of his most famous contributions to jurisprudence, really boils
down to "better answers," the arguments which he finds most convincing, and will work to
convince others to accept. See GAFFNEY, supra note 145, at 186-87.
284 See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 25, at 255-58.
288 See generally Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
286 Sec id. at 98.
257 Sec id. The Florida Supreme Court case that was the subject of the Bush decision,
can be found at Gore v. Maths. 772 So.2d 1243 (Ha. 2000).
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the recount and inclusion of certain votes in Florida's final certified
tota1. 288
 The effect was to preserve George W. Bush's lead in Florida,
and thereby ensure his overall victory. 289
The media immediately dissected the opinions, and the majority
members were widely maligned for their decision. 290 The decision was
considered weak in theory and principle, and explainable only on ex-
tra-legal grounds, 29 ' Specifically, the five majority Justices were criti-
cized for allowing their personal political preferences to improperly
influence their decision. 292
 Critics asserted that the majority Justices
were motivated by an overall preference for the Republican Party and
the Republican candidate. 293
 These critics further asserted that some
of the majority Justices were swayed by their hope to retire under a
Republican President who could appoint a Republican replace-
ment. 294
 Finally, they accused the Justices of acting in an attempt to
cancel out the perceived Democratic preferences of certain members
of the Florida Supreme Court. 295
As a result of these assertions, one vocal critic, Professor Der-
showitz, described the decision as corrupt, and noted that he could
think of no other Supreme Court decision that had been so blatantly
motivated by the Justices' personal political preferences. 298 Dershowitz
set the stage for a discussion of objectivity when he wrote, "Some
judges, of course, do actually apply the law in a neutral manner, with-
out regard to their personal preferences. Others deceive themselves
into believing that the arguments they are offering are neutral—that
is, not explicitly calculated to produce a desired outcome." 297 This
quote restates the question of objectivity, how can a judge neutrally
288
 Sec Bush, 531 U.S. at 100-03.
289
 See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 5, at 51-52.
299
 See id. at 3-5.
291
 Linda Greenhouse, Collision with Politics Risks Court's Legal Credibility, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 11, 2000, at Al.
292
 Sec id. For a summary of contemporaneous critics, see DERsnowtrz, supra note 5, at
174-76. The majority Justices, including, by deduction, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tices Kennett); O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, wrote a per cusiarn, or unsigned, opinion. Sec
Bush, 531 U.S. at 98.
295 See DERsilown -z, supra note 5, at 174-76. Justice O'Connor, for example, is the
"'former Republican floor leader of the Arizona Senate.'" Id. at 160, quoting Robert Novak,
Court That Really Swings, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Dec. 21, 2000, at 39. Justice Kennedy also
was previously involved in Republican politics, he Thad ties to Ronald Reagan . during
Reagan's governorship and to Reagan's executive secretary, Edwin Meese, and had worked
as a lobbyist ...." Dtatsnowrrz, supra note 5, at 162.
294 See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 5, at 162.
29* Sec id.
298 See id. at 174.
297
 See id. at 188.
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apply the law, without allowing personal preferences to distort the
outcome?
Several important issues must be resolved in order to answer this
question. First, is there actually any possibility of an objective decision
in a case like Bush v. Gore? Second, if such a decision is possible, what
guidelines should a judge utilize in making the decision? And third,
what would a judge in Bush have to do to ensure that her decision is
free from impermissible personal preferences?
Part I explored Bernard Lonergan's understanding of objectivity
primarily through his work in epistemology and ethics. 298 Part II ex-
plored Ronald Dworkin's understanding of objectivity primarily
through his work in jurisprudence and political philosophy. 299 Despite
the different contexts of these two approaches to objectivity, both an-
swered substantially similar questions. 890 Part III will first summarize
the two theories of objectivity, then apply both theories to a real world
scenario and compare the effects of their respective explanations.
A. Is Objectivity Possible?
Is objectivity possible in a decision like Bush v. Gore? Dworkin, in
light of his explicit statements about objectivity would answer no. 801
Objectivity for Dworkin is only a matter of good arguments, so it
would be useless to accuse the Justices who decided Bush v. Gore of
corruption. 892 A decision for Bush was as right as a decision for Gore,
because both decisions are equally open to the charge that they were
determined by personal preferences. 808 The only possibility is to dis-
agree with the Justices' reasoning.8" Of course, Dworkin might sug-
gest that the arguments the majority justices actually relied upon were
in fact private arguments, rather than the equal protection arguments
explicitly included in their written opinion, 898 Dworkin could argue
that the majority Justices' personal preference for the Republican
2B°
	 supra notes 108-144, and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 269-284, and accompanying text.
Compare supra notes 108-144 (Lou ergan 's theory of objectivity), and notes 269-284
(Dworkin's theory of objectivity).
301 Dworkin did, however, contrary to this thesis, publish at least two articles attacking
Bush v. Gorr on a number of fronts. Sec Dworkin, supra note I, at 53; Ronald Dworkin, 'A
Badly Flawed Election': An Exchange. N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Feb. 22,2001, at 9.
s°2 Sec DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, Sliptn note 25, at 81,
303
 Personal preference, in this case, takes the form of accepting whatever arguments
the judge finds personally persuasive. See id.
3°4 This did not stop Dworkin from condemning the Bush opinion however. See
Dworkin, supra note 1.
305 Sec Bush, 531 U.S. at 109-10. Dworkin, supra note 1, at 53.
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party should have been accorded much less weight than the legal
principles the Justices customarily may consider. 808 Still, this further
argument does not resolve the problem. Even if a particular Justice
were able to ignore the identities of the contestants and put aside her
personal preferences, it would be impossible, under Dworkin's for-
mula, to determine whether a certain argument in the final decision
was decisive because of its "objective" legal rationale, or if it simply
provided a basis for the Justice to decide the case in the same way that
she voted in the election. 307
 So, according to Dworkin's theory, be-
cause Justice O'Connor favors the Republican party, the fact of her
decision for Bush, the Republican candidate, appears to be proof of
her bias, regardless of the strength of her underlying analysis. 808 Thus,
Dworkin's explicit theory of objectivity ultimately provides no method
by which to differentiate between two options in a hard case, except
personal preference.9D9
Lonergan, on the other hand, would assert that an objective deci-
sion is possible, although not logically necessary. 31 ° An objective deci-
sion would be possible because the Justices who decided between
Bush and Gore are knowers. 3 " As knowers, they have the capacity to
gather data, understand the data, judge the data, evaluate the result-
ing alternatives and choose the best alternative. 312 Within this process,
each Justice has the capacity to critique themself; to experience them-
selves as knowers, to understand themselves as such, and to judge
whether the decisions they have made in regard to the case are con-
taminated.313 If the decisions are in fact contaminated by bias, each
Justice has the capacity to mentally reopen the decision, to ask further
questions, gain further experience, etc. 3" If this cycle is repeated until
305
 See DWORKIN, LAW'S EmPIRE, supra note 25, at 240.
3°7 See id.
308 For a harsh discussion of justice O'Connor's political affiliations, see DERSHOWITZ,
supra note 5, at 156-62.
mg See id. at 81. Since Dworkin's explicit theory of objectivity is so Unhelpful. from here
on this Note will utilize Dworkin's interpretive theory, which possesses many of the charac-
teristics of a theory of objectivity, although Dworkin never phrases it that way.
31° Objectivity is not a logically necessary outcome resulting from a formulaic series of
actions, but Lonergan asserts that it is possible, an assertion with which the reader is free
to disagree. But if it is possible, he continues, there are conditions which give rise to it.
And if there are such conditions, those conditions may be fulfilled, etc. Sec LONERGAN,
INSIGHT, supra note 21, at 141-45,343. The argument, while hopeful, is somewhat tauto-
logical.
311 See id. at 352-53. In regard to the following paragraph, see generally, chs. 11 and 13
LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 21.
512 Sec id. at 346-48.
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all relevant biases have been eliminated and all the further pertinent
questions have been answered, within the applicable time limits, the
decision approaches objectivity 315
B. Objective Method
If an objective decision is in fact possible, what practical steps
could a Justice deciding Bush v. Gore take in order to ensure that their
own decision is actually objective? If we rely on his alternative inter-
pretation argument instead of his explicit theory of objectivity,
Dworkin first provides a guiding motivation for the Justices. 31 ° The
judge's overall goal, according to Dworkin, should be to make a deci-
sion that interprets all the relevant background material, including
the judge's complete understanding of the particular area of law and
society, in its best (most aesthetic) light.317
Dworkin provides a two step elimination process for realizing this
aesthetic result. 318 In the first round of elimination, the judge should
allow only those options that provide a rough fit with the broad pur-
poses of the relevant laws and precedents. 31 ° Following this model, a
Justice deciding Bush v. Gore could quickly narrow the available op-
tions down to a decision either for Bush or for Gore, and exclude a
decision for Nader, for example. 320 The Justice could also narrow her
rationales to her concept of equal protection, and the deference due
a state supreme court, and discard any consideration of tort liability. 321
In the second round of elimination, the judge should choose
from among the remaining options based on their aesthetic appeal—
their "fit" with the existing laws and precedents. 322 Dworkin claims
that while there is a real difference in the strength of various
arguments, there is no general way to evaluate that strength except in
terms of personal preference. 323 If this is true, it seems unlikely that a
community would ever come to a shared understanding of a deeply
3" See id. at 404-05.
ne Sec Dwointmt, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 25, at 52.
317 Sec id. This motivation is informed by appeal to the four principles set out above. Sec
supin notes 193-203 and accompanying text.
319 Sec DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 25, at 65.
319 Sec id. at 231.
329 See Busk, 531 U.S. at 100-01.
521 See id. at 103.
321 See DWORKIN, LAW'S nit pixt.„ supra note 25, at 231.
323 See GAFFNEY, St/Pr/2 note 145, at 187 (using the term 'personal resonance" to de-
scribe the concept described as personal preference in the text). Personal preference re-
fers to Dworkin's theory of objectivity; he claims that arguments are better because they
seem better to the decision maker. See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, Slipta note 25, at 82-83,
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divisive issue.324
 In particular, it should come as no surprise to
Dworkin that the Supreme Court was divided about the validity of the
Supreme Court's decision for Bush. 325
 When the nine Justices evalu-
ated the equal protection arguments that were presented by the par-
ties, five thought that stopping the recount was the option that best fit
prior precedent and law. 32° Four Justices thought otherwise.327 But the
difference between the majority and the minority fits more or less eas-
ily within the unsettled areas of equal protection doctrine where rea-
sonable people can disagree.328
Similarly, Lonergan also initially described a guiding motivation,
but one that is both broader and more basic to objective decision
making.329
 Lonergan based the process of objectivity on human curi-
osity, the desire to know, potentially unrestricted by error and bias. 3"
This curiosity drives the decision maker not only to gain insights, but
correct insights; and thus to continually improve the quality of her
judgments."' The decision maker is genuine insofar as she pursues
decisions, for example in regards to eliminating error and bias, that
improve her capacity to make correct judgments. 332 Thus, for Loner-
gan, the decision maker's first loyalty is to herself as a genuine
seeker.333
 It is through this genuineness that she becomes a goad
judge. 334
Grounded in this concrete orientation toward correct judgments,
the judge proceeds through the activities of experiencing, under-
standing, judging and decision making. 335
 In the first place, the judge
is required to obtain information upon which to base the decision.'"
In a situation like that in Bush v. Gore, this information comes through
several obvious channels, appellants' and amicus briefs, the records of
3" See GAFFNEY, SUP' note 145. at 162; Singer, supra note 12, at 35 n.112 (referring to
Dworkin's dependence on the likelihood of rational consensus within a society, which
Singer, to the contrary, finds unlikely, verging on impossible).
325 See supra notes 285-289 and accompanying text.
326
 This can be deduced from the fact that four justices dissented. Ruth. 531 U.S. at 98.
327 See id.
328
 For example, see the discussion between Dworkin and Fried, where two very intelli-
gent law professors disagreed about exactly this issue. See Dworkin, supra note 301; Fried,
supra note 7.
329 See LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 21, at 404.
35° See id.
33l
	 id. at 405.
332 See id. at 500.
333 See id. at 502-03.
33!
	 LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 21, at 499-502.
355 See id. at 401.
336 See id.
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the lower court decisions, precedent and applicable statutes. 337 It is
also derived, however, from a complex web of prior experiences, long-
held jurisprudential theories, evaluations of the actions and motives
of the lower courts, and so on.338 It would plainly be counter-
productive to expect a judge to forget everything that makes him a
good judge, the experience derived from years spent making difficult
decisions when making a difficult decision. 339
In addition to acquiring and then understanding all this informa-
tion, which includes both the general background experience gained
over a period of years and specific information about this case, the
judge also evaluates, or judges, that understanding. 34° Judging the
understanding includes, first, asking of each piece of information, is it
so?341 Each true bit of understanding can be legitimately synthesized
into an argument that tends to support one party or the other. 342
The final step before deciding is to consider the value of each of
the several arguments. 343 After judging the information, understand-
ings, and judgments with the greatest certainty possible within the
time limits allowed, 344 a judge chooses, considering the value of all the
principles that will be given effect by her choice. 345 In light of this
definition of evaluation, although the decision may initially seem a
simple choice between George W. Bush and Albert Gore, Jr., formu-
lating the problem as binary is injudicious, and tends to obscure the
non-binary complexities that the Justices actually faced. 34° In contrast
to Dworkin's personal preference argument, Lonergan's work ac-
337 Sec Bush, 531 U.S. at 98-100 (noting the various sources the Justices considered
while deciding the case).
336 These are all the various elements of a good, experienced judge, or more broadly,
of any expert in their own field. Sec LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 21, at 209-10 (describ-
ing the process of acquiring expertise in a particular field).
339 Sec id. at 405.
346 See id. at 297.
941 See id. at 298-99.
342 Sec id.
843
 Sec LondAtonnt, hoararr, supra note 21, at 636-37. Evaluation takes a place in Lon-
ergan's structure similar in some regards, to the second interpretive step in Dworkin's
theory. It is significantly different however because where Dworkin's sense of aesthetics
ultimately relies on personal preference, Lonergan's method relies on human curiosity. Sec
supra notes 110-121 and accompanying text.
344 The United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in Bush, for example,
only four days after the Florida Supreme Court's decision. See 531 U.S. at 98,100.
345 See LONERGAN, INSIGHT, Supra note 21. at 624,636.
346 The question presents a false choice between holding a personal preference for
Gore or for Bush, when in fact the judge's understanding of equal protection and federal-
ism might have more impact on the decision. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 112,120-21 (Rehnquist,
Cj., concurring) (basing decision on federalism, and balance of powers).
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knowledges that the real world consequences of the decision did not
boil clown to a binary choice. 347 Nonetheless, much of the criticism of
the final Bush decision failed to appreciate the actual complexity of
the arguments presented by both sides. 348
Lonergan restated his method of decision making in four suc-
cinct principles which encapsulate a judge's responsibility and serve
as guidelines during the decision making process. 349 The first princi-
ple is, be attentive 35°
 The attentive judge directs attention to the rele-
vant experiences, memory and data, that present themselves to her
consciousness."' The second, be in telligent. 352
 The intelligent judge
seeks to understand everything she hasn't already understood, to be-
come aware of "hitherto unnoticed or unrealized possibilities." 353 The
third, be reasonable. 354
 The reasonable judge distinguishes between
viable and unviable alternatives.355
 Finally, the fourth, be responsi-
ble.356
 The responsible judge values alternatives correctly, with an eye
to what is best for society, for the groups involved in the dispute, and
for her own development as an objective decision maker. 357
C. Avoiding Errors
When a judge has engaged in the activities of knowing and deci-
sion making, how can he be sure that he has made a decision free
from bias? Bias in Dworkin's work consists of mistaking weaker argu-
ments for stronger ones, for whatever reason.358 Because Dworkin un-
derstands objective language only as a shortcut for asserting an argu-
ment of universal application, all judgment is essentially based on ar-
347
 Note however that the opposite outcome, a decision in Gore's favor, may well have
subjected the Court to the same type and extent of criticism, only substituting Republican
critics for Democratic critics.
348
 For example. Professor Fried notes the fact that the Florida Supreme Court seemed
to respond poorly to the United States Supreme Court's initial decision and remand
should not be overlooked. See Fried, supra note 328, at 8. Another complex issue involved
the Equal Protection argument, which asked who was harmed, and who, if anyone, had the
right to sue. See id.












 See GAF FN EY, supra note 145, at 162.
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gument.363 Thus, viewed from within Dworkin's framework, his at-
tempt to blame justice O'Connor's personal preferences, namely her
political ties to the Republican party, for the outcome of the case, can
be viewed as an attempt by Dworkin to avoid the fact that she holds a
different view of equal protection than Dworkin, and there is very lit-
tle Dworkin can do about that fact. 36° No matter how strongly
Dworkin might disagree with her decision, under Dworkin's
definition of objectivity, he can never logically claim the right to en-
force his own decision over that of a judge. 361
By contrast, Lonergan's treatment of error is thorough and
methodologically conclusive. He discusses a number of ways in which
bias creeps into decision-making activities. 362 At the most basic level,
fear of understanding can undermine the force driving the entire ac-
tivity of decision making, the pure desire to know.363 Simple egotism
can also interfere with the process. 364 A judge who expected to realize
personal gain from a particular decision could be open to this sort of
influence. 365 Or a subtler group egotism, for example Republican ver-
sus Democrat, could distort the decision.366
These biases can only be corrected through a difficult, long-term
process of introspection, deVelopment, and, ultimately, transcen-
dence. 367 A judge who frequently makes overtly objective decisions is
likely to have become conscious of, and to have worked to eliminate,
these biases in herself over the course of her career. 368 And yet, with-
out both a general theory of error and correction, and further, with-
out some foundation upon which to proceed, bias may go undetected
333 See id.
360 Sec id. It is quite possible that most people would disagree with a judge's use of a
particular argument, but it would still be a simple disagreement.
361 Unless, for example, Dworkin assumes that his power to supercede the judge's un-
derstanding is based on the fact that a majority of the population has granted hint the
power to do so. Such a resort to the brute force of democratic majorities would, however,
undermine Dworkin's position in opposition to the Critical Legal Scholars. See DwoRKIN,
Law's EMPIRE, supra note 25, at 440 n.19; c.f. Singer, supra note 12, at 98-49 (describing
much of traditional legal theory, including Dworkin's work, as inherently illegitimate at-
tempts to force people to agree by reason instead of force).
362 See LoNERGAN, MIGHT, supra note 21. at 249.
363 Sec id. at 214.
364 See id. at 245.
365 SeeDukstiowytz, supra note 5, at 162.
366 See LONERGAN, INsuurr, supra note 21, at 247-50.
367 Sec id. at 500-02.
368 Sec id. at 318 (explaining that as one attempts to become a 'reliable judge" one will
engage in the self-corrective process of learning, which prunes bias).
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even by a conscientious judge. 363
 In the context of a particular case, a
careful judge should consciously review all the potential sources of
bias arising in the case, especially those which have been previously
identified as particularly germane to the individual judge. 37°
Specifically in the context of the Bush v. Gore decision, critics have
identified a number of perceived biases that may have affected the
final outcome of the case. 37' Ultimately, Lonergan's method does not
claim to definitely determine if Bush v. Gore was decided objectively or
not, because his method is primarily focused inwardly. 372 Lonergan's
method does, however, provide both a method by which to evaluate
one's own response to the Supreme Court's decision, and, at a mini-
mum, a shared framework around which to conduct a dialogue and
critique of the decision. 373
Lonergan's description of the varieties of bias suggests a further
avenue for consideration, 374
 In the context of American society as a
whole, a judge faced with' a political decision should consider if bias
has crept into the process of choosing judges. 375 Are judges chosen for
their objectivity, or exactly for their perceived ideological bias? If the
latter seems to be the case, the ruthless pursuit of objectivity becomes
even more important for the individual judge. 376 Knowing that she
has been selected as a judge based on partisan concerns, she must
determine whether her trite duty lies to objectivity or to her patrons.
If to objectivity, then she must search out these partisan biases and
eliminate them. 377
 If judges in the United States are chosen for their
partisan commitment, that answer also seems to call for a meaningful
critique of society, a critique that can provide the impetus for com-
munal introspection, correction, and further development. 378
366
 Lonergan referred to biases as blind spots (scotoma). Of course the problem with
blind spots is that one is often unaware of them until too late. See id. at 215-27.
370
 For example, if a judge knows that she was raised as a Republican and has acted
with political motives in making previous decisions, she must scrutinize how her political
affiliation affects the current decision, perhaps more than she examines other, less rele-
vant, aspects of the decision, such as gender.
371
 See DERssiowiTz, supra note 5, at 151-72.
572
 The basis of Lonergan's work is cognitional structure, and cognitional structure is
based on an inner sense of curiosity. See supra notes 39-79 and accompanying text.
3" See. e.g.. Brennan, supra note 22, at 292-302.
374 Sec supra notes 122-126 and accompanying text.
575
 Dershowitz noted this problem in the context of the Bush v. Gore decision. See DER-
snowm, supra note 5, at 187-90,197-200.
576 See LONERGAN, INstotr, supra note 21, at 310-11.
3" See LONERGAN, AI ETHOD, supra note 21, at 44.
576 This critique is the sort of activity Lonergan called for in cosmopolis, although
cosmopolis is not a formal academy or any sort of organization as such. Rather cosmopolis
is a type of person or a state of mind. See LONERGAN, INSIGHT, SUP? note 21, at 263-67.
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CONCLUSION
Bernard Lonergan's philosophy provides a rich, detailed founda-
tion upon which to base a normative method for objective decision
making by judges and lawyers. This foundation is constructed from a
brilliant, comprehensive, yet at the same time practical, understand-
ing of how people think and know. While building the complex stnic-
lure that leads up to the possibility of an objective judgment, Loner-
gait returned at each step to the driving force of the human intel-
lect—a sense of wonder and innate curiosity. It is this curiosity that
drives the basic cognitional structure of experiencing, understanding
and judging. It is this same curiosity that makes it possible for a willing
thinker to search for and eliminate errors. And finally it is curiosity
that allows the thinker to reflect. on her own process of knowing, to
evaluate the extent to which she has discovered and corrected errors
within herself, and finally to determine the probability that her deci-
sion is objective.
Lonergan's method for objective decision making is well suited to
the specialized field of law. And Lonergan's work on objectivity com-
pares favorably with that of Dworkin, a leading legal philosopher.
Lonergan's work even successfully addresses a few areas where
Dworkin's work seems to disappoint. Based on this analysis, Loner-
gan's contributions to general philosophy should not be lost to the
law merely because of a shortage of work specifically applying his
thinking to the law. Hopefully, legal philosophers will have cause to
consider Lonergan's work more frequently in the future.
ROB HANSON
